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ABSTRACT 
The Rawlsian model of public justification is proposed for the assessment of politics of moral 
enhancement, in alternative to the neo-republican model proposed in these debates by Robert 
Sparrow. The central idea of the Rawlsian model of public justification is represented by the 
liberal principle of legitimacy, although it is extended in relation to the domain that Rawls sees 
as proper for its application (constitutional essentials). The liberal principle of legitimacy in its 
extended application requires that a law or public policy be justified on the base of reasons for 
which we can reasonably expect that other citizens can accept as free and equal citizens. The 
application is extended to children as prospective agents, as well. From the standpoint of the 
liberal principle of legitimacy, valid public reasons put forward in the moral enhancement debate 
are represented by the assessment of whether emotional modulation is progressive or regressive 
in relation to the capacity of moral judgment. The conclusion is that, at the actual stage of the 
debate, there are no victorious reasons to endorse any of the two proposals. Consequently, this is 
a domain of reasonable pluralism. Compulsory moral enhancement is ruled out, but mandatory 
moral enhancement is allowed. Usages of public funds for researches that concern moral 
bioenhancement are proper matter of democratic decision making. 
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1. Researches have confirmed the neurophysiologic bases of the dispositions of 
moral relevance. Neurotransmitters, like serotonin or oxytocin, have been proven 
to influence morally relevant attitudes, like sympathy, trust, aggressiveness or 
reaction to (un)fairness (Crockett et al., 2010; Crocket et al., 2014; Rakić, 2014).  
On this ground, some authors argue for the project of medical bioenhancement 
– treatments to enhance our morality. Thomas Douglas welcomes the possibility to 
enhance our moral dispositions, in order to reduce our countermoral dispositions 
(Douglas, 2008). Persson and Savulescu have rendered the debate even more 
dramatic (Persson and Savulescu, 2012). They say that there is a worrisome 
combination of facts in the actual world. On one hand, scientific improvement has 
led us to the possible destruction of valuable life on our planet. Climate change and 
environmental destruction require sensible policy changes that imply a reduction 
of the level of welfare in the developed countries today, as well as increased 
solidarity with the developing countries. Terrorism is an increasing danger because 
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of weapons of mass destruction, which implies the reduction of some civil right 
currently recognized in liberal democracies. On the other hand, our moral 
psychological endowment is underdeveloped for supporting such changes. The 
reason derives from our inherited features that suite well with different conditions 
of living: limited altruism, bias in favour of the immediate, bias in favour of acts 
vs. omissions, etc. In their thesis, traditional resources of moral enhancement have 
proved to be insufficient. This is the reason why they propose to support them 
with the resources of moral bioenhancement. This consists in making use of 
biotechnologies to improve our morally relevant dispositions. 
The debate is already intense and several arguments have been put in it, in 
favour or in opposition to moral bioenhancement. Robert Sparrow is engaged in 
framing the debate in political and social terms. He objects to Persson and 
Savulescu that “their argument neglects the political dimensions of freedom in 
cases where enhancement is imposed upon other people” (Sparrow, 2014, 26). A 
great part of the focus of the current debate regards threats to individual freedom 
from the standpoint of the capacities of the individuals involved. But, says 
Sparrow, “freedom is also a relation between persons” (Sparrow, 2014, 26). Here it 
appears as a relevant difference between the relations in education and biological 
manipulation of behaviour.  
The supposed analogy has been impugned by supporters of biomedical moral 
enhancement (Persson and Savulescu, 2012, 113; DeGrazia, 2014, 366). But 
Sparrow says that moral education is a communicative action. The educator 
transmits the messages, but “implicit in this relationship is the requirement that 
the educator must, if called upon to do so, be able to justify the norms that have 
shaped the educational project and its content with reasons that the person being 
educated should accept” (Sparrow, 2014, 26). But the recipient of education can 
respond with counterarguments. The relation, therefore, is communicative and 
compatible with the freedom of the recipient of education. On the other hand, 
biomedical enhancement operates in instrumental or technical mode. The relation 
is characterized by inequality, because in such a situation a subject simply 
operates toward a recipient. Sparrow seems to require a real and actual 
justificatory relation, with the recipients of enhancement actually being able to 
participate in the justificatory interchange. 
In support of his view, Sparrow appeals to the republican view of freedom as 
non-domination. In biomedical moral enhancement there is a relation of 
domination, because one person decides about the dispositions she will inculcate in 
another person. In only one case autonomy is saved in the context of biomedical 
moral enhancement, i.e. in the situation where an individual makes the decision to 
enhance herself by developing her own ability to achieve higher-order desires (but 
I would add preferences and projects, as well) by medicaments. If we accept 
Sparrow’s view on freedom, it seems that moral bioenhancement is ruled out at the 
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very beginning of the debate. But I think that we must substitute the conception 
of freedom endorsed by Sparrow with a different conception of freedom. It is a 
conception of freedom based on an idea of public justification of laws and policies.  
Such a conception is different from Sparrow’s in two important ways. In the 
view expressed by Sparrow in the paper that I summarize above, an agent is 
treated as free only if she has the role of a discursive active participant in the 
formative processes that regard her. In the public justificatory view of freedom 
(that I endorse), an agent is treated as free if we can reasonably expect that public 
decisions that concern her can be justified to her as a free and equal citizen 
(actually, or to her as a prospective agent). This means that the justification is 
based on reasons that she can endorse (are accessible to her) as a free and equal 
person. The agent may at a certain time be unaware of the justification, and even 
refuse the justification (for example, in virtue of epistemic laziness, stubbornness, 
etc.). She is, nonetheless, treated as free and equal because, after respectable 
reasoning, she can recognize that the reasons treat her as free and equal. For 
example, this happens if reasons do not deny (a) certain basic rights, liberties and 
opportunities; (b) the assignment of special priority to them; (c) measures to ensure 
to all citizens the use of them (Rawls, 1993/2005, 6). Moreover, the reasons must 
not be related to controversial comprehensive doctrines that may be not accessible 
to the agent even after respectable reasoning. 
One of the advantages of the conception of freedom that I endorse is that it is 
more realistically applicable. I see an unhelpful idealization and discrepancy with 
reality in Sparrow’s exemplification of his conception of freedom in the domain of 
education. Relations, there, are mostly paternalistic. For many stages of the 
child’s development, the justificatory exchanges that Sparrow speaks about have 
only the form of caricature. In such stages, the contribution of the recipient of 
education consists in the famous ‘why, why, why’ typical of children. Even in later 
steps the relation is far from taking place in conditions of equality that would 
ensure a real communicative exchange. 
Another advantage is that the strong requirement for the legitimacy of 
applying enhancement procedures potentially damages the potential recipient. 
Namely, the requirement forbids even to apply measures that would certainly 
increase favourable life conditions for her. Imagine a situation where the 
intelligence of the prospective agent is enhanced. 
Importantly, one of the basic ideas of the concept of freedom that I endorse 
and, therefore, of public justification is to respect pluralism, with different citizens 
living with their different conceptions of good life, or simply way of life, in 
common institutions. Interventions on individuals require particularly strong 
justification, and frequently may be applied only in a temporarily limited form. 
Consequently, although the legitimacy of biomedical moral enhancement is not 
excluded at the very beginning, it is difficult to justify it. 
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John Harris is engaged in opposing moral bioenhancement and explaining why 
it damages freedom. It is important to clarify the concept of freedom that is 
involved: “the ability to choose rationally and freely according to principles and 
practices that are plausible as candidates for moral action. […] So far from raising 
consciousness […] it may well dull it to the point where the individual is no longer 
choosing” (Harris, 2014, 372). This is because moral bioenhancement, as 
formulated by its proponents, consists in direct emotional modulation that 
bypasses moral reasoning. So, the real loss is the possibility of making reasoned 
moral choices, because the resulting motivations, deprived of reasoning, would be 
insufficiently fine-grained. What is pro-social behaviour in a context may be anti-
social behaviour in wider contexts. In some cases a violent action can be the 
morally proper action, for example, when we need to shoot a person who wants to 
kill an innocent person, in order to save the latter (Harris, 2014, 373). 
This is a clear basis for public justification that relies on the provision of valid 
public reasons. Precisely, this is a valid public reason for refusing moral 
bioenhancement. This, however, does not immediately mean that it is a victorious, 
conclusive, reason.  
To Harris’s objection that appeals to the insufficiently fine-grained and 
context sensitive reactions of people emotionally modulated, Persson and 
Savulescu answer that some dispositions, like a low level of empathy and a high 
level of aggression are always opposed to what we require from morality. Even if a 
certain level of aggression might be required for moral life, anger must be 
proportionate to the size of the offence, and a proper sense of justice is needed for 
this proportionality, as well as for directing it to the right people.  
This, however, is not a sufficient reply to Harris. He appeals to the fact that 
the valence of emotions changes, not only to variations in gradation. Sometimes, a 
high level of aggression is the proper reaction, like when we need to shoot a 
terrorist in order to save a group of people. What we need is not moral 
bioenhancement, but sophisticated reasoning, which in Harris’s view means 
making reasonable use of political and moral theories. Thus, even in cases when 
noble moral emotions (altruism, sympathy, etc.) are not felt, or they are not felt 
for particular groups, the answer is not using biomedical emotional modulation. 
“That is when you need moral philosophy, moral reasoning. [...] Moral reasoning is 
needed to identify the appropriate objects for sympathy, empathy and the sort of 
generalized love that is the conclusion of a moral argument” (Harris, 2013, 170).  
The dispute, therefore, has as one of its main focuses the nature of reliable 
moral judgment. Harris is clearly on the rationalistic side: “To believe that 
emotions can deliver answers to moral dilemmas is like believing that the gut is an 
organ of thought, or one that can answer complex, combined theoretical and 
empirical, questions. [...] Ethical judgments cannot, literally cannot, be felt. There 
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is no sense organ for such a feeling” (Harris, 2013a, 288). Moral judgment, in 
Harris’s view, is exclusively a matter of an argument toward a conclusion.  
But it is important to remember that proposers of biomedical moral 
enhancement through emotional modulation do not oppose the cognitive role in 
morality. Recipients may be ready to accept emotional modulation as a 
supplementary resource only. Douglas, for example, says that even if it was true 
that cognitive enhancement is the privileged resource for moral enhancement, this 
does not eliminate the possibility of using emotional enhancement as a further 
resource. To those who say that it is better to achieve enhancement by reasoning 
only, Douglas replies by asking why not recur to emotional modulation if cognitive 
resources fail (Douglas, 2013, 163; see also Douglas, 2014, 77-79)? 
Such recourse is needed, because racial stereotypes, or false beliefs, are not 
always the (primary) causes of racism. He appeals to neurological researches that 
indicate the presence of racial bias in cases where there are no false or stereotypical 
beliefs, and “results from neuroimaging studies suggest that implicit racial bias 
and stereotypical beliefs are mediated by distinct neural systems; the bias is 
associated with amygdala activity, which is also implicated in mediating fear and 
other basic emotions, while the stereotypic beliefs appear to be mediated by neural 
systems associated with other rational and cognitive processes. Moreover, even if 
racial aversion was created by cognitive processes, it is not excluded that it might 
be attenuated by other means than the correction of cognitive flaws (Douglas, 
2013, 164).  
 
 
2. All participants in the dispute agree that we must improve the actual situation 
with morality and that part of the moral distortions in the actual situation is 
represented by emotional distortions of moral insights. The two sides are opposed 
in relation to the solution: emotional enhancement as one of the resources vs 
exclusive cognitive enhancement. The former side embraces the view that there 
will always be a strong and influent emotional component in morality, and thus 
part of the needed improvement is represented by emotional enhancement. 
Authors in the opposed side say that progress consists in eroding emotional 
influence on morality, as well as in the affirmation of rationality. Rationality can 
help us to overcome actual emotional limits, like limited empathy.  
I am sceptical about the strength of rationality affirmed by Harris, in 
particular if we speak about rationality in the form of moral theories. The first 
question that we can ask in relation to this is: which moral theory? Let’s see some 
rationalistic moral theories. One of them is represented by attempts of reducing 
the whole of morality to a utilitarian calculus. It is difficult to endorse such a view 
without empathy for the whole of humanity, or, at least, a vast part of it (or, 
maybe, of all sentient beings) – a person who is uninterested about other beings 
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will hardly endorse such a view. The emphatic and sympathetic components 
appear foundational. There are views that appeal to rational models of behaviour 
as the foundation of morality, like in David Gauthier’s proposal (Gauthier, 1987). 
Here there are problems, as well, remarked by authors who indicate that there can 
always be a situation when it is rational to cheat, and thus such rationalistic 
foundation of morality fails. Such criticisms affirm the necessity to recur to moral 
emotions in protection of morality (Gaus, 2011, 53-100). There are rationalistic 
views that attempt to derive the whole of morality from the logic of moral 
language (Hare, 1963; Hare, 1981), or from that of morally relevant concepts 
(Gewirth, 1978). Such attempts are far distant from being victorious in ethical 
debates. Perhaps, one might say, improvement can appear in virtue of cognitive 
enhancement. But, can we say this, after years and years of engagement in this 
project of people whom we can count among the most intelligent? 
In general, new moral theories that find true answers to moral questions are 
not sufficient to attain moral improvements. Moral improvements follow from 
various sources: historical processes, changes of social relations due to changes of 
productive resources and economic activities, changes in the range and strength of 
empathy and sympathy, capacities of groups to affirm what matters to them, 
deliberation, reflection, reasoning, etc. Things being as they are, the reasonable 
view appears to make use of all possible resources that we have. I find the dilemma 
moral/emotional enhancement vs cognitive enhancement to be a wrong one. 
Instead of looking for general paradigms that establish whether the essential of 
moral development is emotional or rational, it is important to see in specific cases 
what the relevant failures that need improvement are, and what are the feasible 
improvements. I think that it is improbable that abstract reasoning alone can 
bring improvements. Reasoning, moral reasoning as well as reasoning in other 
fields, depends on various influences, among else on emotional commitments that 
influence us in varying attribution of strength and weight to pieces of evidence or 
reasoning. There might not be anything irrational in attributing more weight to 
some evidence instead of some other evidence, or requiring some level of 
corroboration of a conclusion instead of some other levels of corroboration under 
the influence of emotional sensibility. The important thing may be whether the 
emotional commitments are proper. One solution might be to strengthen the role 
of reasoning. But is it sufficient? We have no guarantee according to our actual 
knowledge, and it may well be that emotional enhancement is part of what we 
need for cognitive enhancement. Cultivating emotions might be part of the moral 
resources and part of what we need for correct moral reasoning. It does not follow 
a recommendation to bypass moral reflection. I do not propose to leave morality to 
the exclusive role of intuition, emotion or something that we might call the ‘moral 
nose’, nor do I suggest that moral feelings must be confirmed by relying on moral 
feelings only (cfr. Harris, 2012, 294). Reasoning is important to correct wrong 
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emotional reaction. It is true that the same emotional capacities (let’s say, 
empathy and sympathy) can lead us to endorsing the right moral response, as well 
as the wrong moral response. We must always submit to scrutiny of moral 
reasoning our emotional reactions, including empathic ones. We must verify 
whether we can really embrace a moral attitude by seeing whether it conforms 
with the other attitudes that we have, with our past responses, with the principles 
that we embrace, whether we will be ready to behave coherently with the new 
attitude… I do not see that any participant in the moral biomedical enhancement 
debate denies this. 
The relevant fact for the concept of public justification that I endorse is that 
there is no final response about the exact role and weight of rationality and of 
emotions in morality, and, therefore, about the usefulness of moral 
bioenhancement. This is important for the legitimacy of possible laws and public 
policies in relation to moral biomedical enhancement. Another domain of 
controversy is related to moral pluralism. The objection says that there is no 
consensus about the content of morality, and, therefore, about the features to 
enhance. As a consequence, moral bioenhancement would represent an abuse on 
people who do endorse the view that the induced dispositions are valuable. The 
reply to this says that we must avoid enhancing on the base of controversial values 
and favour only values that are not objects of reasonable disagreement between 
agents who care about morality (DeGrazia, 2014). Similarly, Persson and 
Savulescu are right in saying that “no state can be morally neutral to other-
regarding harm” (Persson and Savulescu, 2014, 40). There are values that we can 
legitimately protect, as well as other we can legitimately oppose, because in doing 
this we do not disrespect reasonable pluralism. They are destructive of any kind of 
society, except, perhaps, of societies that are based on repression and strong 
coercive control. 
The relevant conclusions at this point are: 
(a) There is, actually, reasonable disagreement about whether it is in principle 
possible to realize moral enhancement through biomedical emotional modulation. 
(b) There is a space of overlapping consensus about the necessary features of 
morality on which all reasonable doctrines must converge. Dissenting with moral 
claims in this area is unreasonable. This matters, because if it were not so, two of 
the three public policies about moral bioenhancement that I discuss would be 
immediately ruled out.  
Before proceeding to further conclusions let’s remember the general principles 
of justification of public policies and laws. Public policies and laws derive 
legitimacy on the base of public justification. Public justification is based on valid 
public reasons, i.e. reasons for which we can reasonably expect that each citizen 
can accept them as a free and equal citizen. Among such reasons there are 
principles protective of freedoms. But we must endorse all principles reasonably, in 
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virtue of the complications of real life conditions. For example, we may be in the 
situation that we must attenuate the rigour of the principles of justice, inclusive of 
those protective of freedoms. This might imply weakening the protective space of 
individuals’ sovereignty and allow moral enhancement interventions. However, 
such weakening always needs particularly strong justification. It is difficult to 
provide such justification when experts diverge on relevant matters.  
 
 
3. The reasonable conclusion in virtue of this conception of public justification and 
of the actual stage of debate distinguished by inconclusiveness about the role of 
emotions and rationality for moral development, as well as about the limits of 
moral pluralism, is that public policy and regulation related to biomedical moral 
enhancement (when it becomes safe and reliable) must be diversified for various 
contexts. There are convincing arguments that indicate that human behaviour 
(inclusive of moral behaviour) is influenced by a neurophysiological basis, and 
nobody seems to deny this. Such neurophysiological basis provokes countermoral 
emotions and dispositions. There are no conclusive proofs that we can overcome 
this by moral reasoning alone. But there is no indication, at the moment, that we 
will have medicaments that can enhance our morality in the sufficiently fine-
grained way. Nor that biomedical moral enhancement by itself may be efficacious. 
Although there are authors who offer valid public reasons to worry about our 
future without biomedical moral enhancements, their arguments are, for the 
moment, not victorious. Are, in virtue of this, policies of moral bioenhancement 
the proper subject of democratic public decision making? In virtue of the absence 
of victorious public reasons and of the invasiveness of biomedical moral 
enhancement in the lives of agents, it is probably reasonable (in the Rawlsian sense 
of respectful of agents as free and equal) not to make moral bioenhancement 
mandatory. There are people who reasonably believe that biomedical moral 
enhancement through emotional modulation is pernicious, and, thus, at minimum, 
it cannot be reasonably imposed to them.  
The only possibility of legitimately making moral bioenhancement compulsory 
as the result of a process of voting grounded on public reasons would be present if 
we could not avoid this as an urgent public decision.  
If there were good public reasons to think that (i) limited altruism and the 
ideal of individualism and material success leads to Ultimate Harm; (ii) people 
embrace them under the strong influence of the neurophysiological features of 
these people; (iii) there are reliable biomedical resources to remove the 
neurophysiological bases of such dispositions and ideals; (iv) possible side effects 
are not worrisome, then it would be reasonable to vote about the use of moral 
bioenhancement, independently of the existence of people who actually oppose 
these ideas. If the premises were true, respecting their worldviews would cause a 
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great threat for the rest of humanity, as well as to themselves. This is the reason 
why moral bioenhancement can be imposed to them. The case is analogous to the 
notorious Mill’s bridge example. In favour of the imposition of moral 
bioenhancement, here, there is the harm principle, as well as the fact that there 
would be valid, although inconclusive, public reasons for the people who actually 
oppose moral enhancement to accept the policy as free and equal agents. After all, 
without surviving, or in a world rendered a poor place to live in, they would be 
unable to pursue dispositions and values that they have. 
 But, if we can postpone the public decision, the proper solution is to do this 
and respect freedoms of citizens, until we dispose of victorious public reasons. 
Reasonable pluralism about the opportunity to make use of biomedical moral 
enhancement, as well as its invasiveness in the lives of people, make it better to 
leave to individual conscience whether to accept it, or not. It is very difficult to 
ensure the legitimacy of voting in matters that are so invasive in people’s lives. In 
any event, before voting on such measures that override personal freedoms of 
people, it is necessary to explore all other, less coercive, possible resources. 
(Farrelly, 2007, 168-169, 202) 
The discussion is, however, strongly hypothetical and provisional. As far as I 
know, there is no one proposing to apply moral bioenhancement in the actual 
condition. As Persson and Savulescu say, “We have only argued that we should 
pursue research into moral bioenhancement, not spray oxytocin in the air” 
(Persson and Savulescu, 2014, 42). So the question in which I am engaged is 
whether to apply moral bioenhancement in a prospective situation when 
technological resources for moral bioenhancement would be safe and efficient.  
We do not know now the answers for that situation. Actual projections are 
based on arguments about the relative role of rationality and emotions in moral 
deliberation. On the base of the state of the art in this debate, we can say that 
there is reasonable disagreement about whether applying emotional modulation 
technology would be progressive or regressive even in conditions when we could 
have safe and efficient technologies of emotional modulation. Consequently, there 
is the provisional and conditional conclusion that it is better to leave decisions to 
individual deliberation, if not pressed by the unavoidability of making a common 
public decision.  
A possible alternative to compulsory moral bioenhancement is voluntary 
moral bioenhancement supported by state incentives, like in Vojin Rakić’s 
proposal (Rakic, 2014; Rakic, 2014a). For some, compulsory enhancement is the 
only relevant one, because they think that only in such a case bioenhancement can 
cope with free riding in environmental responsibility, as well as with terrorism. 
Such intention cannot be satisfied by leaving moral bioenhancement as a free 
choice (Sparrow, 2014a, 21). But Rakic (Rakic, 2014, 38), as well as Persson and 
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Savulescu (Persson and Savulescu, 2014, 41) offer convincing reasons for accepting 
the idea that voluntary moral bioenhancement can offer appreciable results. 
The advantage of voluntary moral bioenhancement is that it is a legitimate 
free choice of individuals. But Sparrow puts a challenge to it, nonetheless. The 
challenge is related to possible harmful social consequences of even voluntary 
moral bioenhancement. Precisely, the issue regards threats for equality. 
Biomedical moral enhancement might create people with more developed moral 
capacities, who, therefore, would be able to create and participate in superior 
forms of social cooperation (Lindsay, 2005; Douglas, 2013a, 482-483). As such, 
they might have a superior moral status, or they may be uninterested in forming a 
moral community with ordinary humans. Buchanan denies that morally enhanced 
agents would have a superior moral status, because moral status is a threshold 
concept (Buchanan, 2009). Douglas refuses Buchanas’s thesis, but does not think 
that differences in moral status are a decisive problem, after all (Douglas, 2013a).  
 Sparrow is primarily focused on the danger that derives from classifying the 
morality obtained by single persons in relation to investigations of genetics or 
neurochemistry. People who are not subject to moral enhancement, as well as 
people for whom the procedure has produced weaker results, could be 
discriminated. “The prospect of being able to reliably identify some people as, by 
biological constitution, significantly and consistently more moral than others 
would seem to pose a profound challenge to egalitarian social and political ideals. 
In particular, it raises the question of whether the morally enhanced should have 
different rights to morally ordinary citizens and perhaps even be granted 
privileged access to positions of social and political power in order that social and 
political decisions are made more morally?” (Sparrow, 2014a, 24).  
 In my view, the crucial question, here, is whether enhanced and, let’s say, 
ordinary agents have an interest in cooperation. There are reasons to think that 
they do. I rely on an analogy with the actual world. In our actual life we have 
morally more developed people, some of them at an incomparable level to that of 
others. But there is no indication that they have in any time required a privileged 
status in society. Generally, they have been engaged in striking for progress in 
equality, not for privileges. Think of Martin Luther King, Gandhi, etc.  
It is true that people at this level of moral development might create a more 
developed society in comparison to even the most developed societies in actual 
world, if they were able to create a society among themselves. Consequently, they 
may become uninterested to live in society with, let’s say, ordinary people, and 
create their own separate society distinguished by a high level of civic virtues, 
perhaps similar to the one wished by Jefferson et al. (Jefferson et al., 2014) But, if 
this happened, there would not be any new inequalities in societies. Enhanced 
agents would live in their society as equals, and ordinary humans would live in 
their societies as they do now.  
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But such a secessionist scenario appears to have really low probability. The 
realistic scenario is that all these agents would continue to live in the same society. 
One of the reasons is that the morally enhanced, when they choose with whom to 
cooperate, do not do this by having in mind interests as their overriding 
motivation (Wilson, 2014, 35). Moreover, if the morally enhanced decided to form 
their specific societal projects, it is probable that they would do this for programs 
that are beneficial for the whole society, like coping with climate change (Marshall, 
2014, 29). If anyone is in danger, then these are the morally enhanced people, who, 
as such, are prone to respect fair terms of cooperation, while other people are 
subject to the moral limits remarked by the supporters of morally enhancement. 
 Sparrow worries, nonetheless, that the morally enhanced would have a 
privileged position. “Of course, there is also a more direct argument to the 
conclusion that a society that consisted of some people who are morally enhanced 
and some people who are not might be justified in establishing a differentiated set 
of citizenship rights. Famously, in The Republic, Plato argued that the just society 
should be ruled by an elite group of Guardians, who would be most able to decide 
social and political questions in the public interest. Similarly, it might be argued 
that we should pay more attention to the views of the morally enhanced than 
those of other citizens when it comes to resolving social and political controversies 
(Sparrow, 2014a, 24). 
 Such a scenario, however, has low probability outside of a thought 
experiment context. What is the ground to think that ordinary people would 
accept such an order? A different question is related not with the Platonic scenario, 
but with some plausible conceptions of democracy that might find a politically 
privileged space for morally enhanced citizens. Such views vary from elitist 
conceptions of democracy (where the democratic nature of society manifests itself 
only in the process of election), to epistemic and deliberative conceptions of 
democracy (Sparrow, 2014a, 24-26). But why would a privileged role for morally 
enhanced people (provided they are really morally enhanced) represent anything 
wrong in such contexts (Persson and Savulescu, 2014, 42), provided the privileged 
position is established democratically, let’s say, by popular voting, or by 
appointment of an institution of representative democracy? The final judgment on 
this depends on what the privileged position would mean. If it means privileged 
access to counsel boards it is difficult to see a threat to democracy. A possible 
position is that of being part of a body with the right to hold a referendum, if the 
body is dissatisfied with a law proposed by the government or passed on by the 
parliament. Such are privileged positions, but the final word is that of the demos.  
 A different kind of privilege is represented by diversified suffrage. But on 
what reasons could we think that such a proposal could be accepted in our 
democratic orders? After all, this does not happen in actual society, despite the 
actual presence of more developed moral agents (Ram-Tihtin, 2014, 43). What are 
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the reasons to think that it is more probable that people will attribute to 
biomedically morally enhanced people diverse suffrage, in comparison with the 
probability of diverse suffrage to more educated people in the actual world, as Mill 
required? 
Moreover, as Sparrow anticipates, because of being morally enhanced these 
people would not want leading positions without fair democratic elections 
(Sparrow, 2014a, 25). It seems probable that morally enhanced people would 
pursue their public offices with both the openness to participate in fair 
justificatory debates with all citizens in the justification of public laws and public 
policies, as well as not being prone to abuse of their power. Otherwise, what does 
their enhancement consist in? The realistic danger that I see is that society will not 
be able to make use of the possibility to give the proper public influence to the best 
people, and not that such people will abuse the situation. But this is only a 
hypothesis. For a serious thesis, we need serious empirical evidence, for example, in 
order to establish an analogy with what happens in the actual world in relation to 
the attribution of leading roles to people distinguished by valuable moral features. 
I suspect that probably this evidence would show that astute client politicians are 
more successful than those who embrace moral standing.  
  A further problem for Sparrow’s argument is that it requires the assumption 
that there is equality in the morality of people in the actual world, which would be 
subverted by moral bioenhancement. But Persson and Savulescu rightly say that 
such an equality is not actually present. Moral bioenhancement might be 
successful in establishing it, instead of subverting it (Persson and Savulescu, 2014, 
41). With more caution, Marshall says the same (Marshall, 2014, 29).  
 More basically, there is the challenge put forward by Wilson. It is not true 
that morally enhanced people are the best for having leading roles. Other virtues 
are required, as well, and they may prevail (Wilson, 2014, 36).  
 Another possible threat remarked by Sparrow is that biomedical moral 
enhancement will not be effective and we will only wrongly think that some people 
are morally enhanced. It is probable that such people will abuse the situation 
(Sparrow, 2014a, 26). I do not particularly fear this possibility. In fact, nothing 
would change in comparison to the actual world situation, where politicians are 
frequently in charge in virtue of their ability to show themselves as being different 
from what they are.  
 Things may be even less dangerous in a situation where politicians would use 
bad science that fallaciously confirms their neurophysiological superiority, in 
comparison to a situation where politicians make use of even more dangerous and 
manipulative resources to obtain and preserve power. Among else, such resources 
include potentiating nationalistic and religious opposition, ideological 
confrontation, and even hate speech against political rivals. The strategy 
frequently consists in insulating electorates, by picturing political rivals as 
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disgusting, unreliable, and people who do not even deserve to be listened. So, 
speaking about political competition in USA, Robert Talisse comments the 
political rhetoric of both the Left, as well as the Right, which both “promotes the 
view that all opponents are intellectually defective and thus unworthy of 
engagement. […] Apparently […] one need not actually listen to what one’s 
opponents say in order to talk to them; talking to them (of course, only when one 
must) amounts to dismissing them regardless of what they might say. Picking up 
on this general line, the conservative Michael Savage contends that his liberal 
opponents – possibly more than half of all adult Americans who vote, mind you – 
suffer from a ‘mental disorder’ (2005). […] A similar state of affairs prevails in the 
world of liberal commentary. For instance, in his ‘fair and balanced’ examination 
of those with whom he disagrees, the liberal Al Franken (2003) casts those on the 
Right as ‘lying liars’” (Talisse, 2009, 65). Among the countries that I know better I 
can remember Berlusconi speaking for years of the communist threat, or about the 
nationalistic rhetoric in Croatia, as well as in other former Yugoslav countries.  
 Let’s remember that the question under consideration is whether to make 
voluntary medical bioenhancement a matter of free choice among individuals, and 
that only very strong reasons can defeat personal freedoms. Sparrow has not 
provided such sufficient reasons to defeat voluntary moral bioenhancement as a 
matter of personal freedom.  
 On the other hand, supplying public incentives, like in Rakic’s  proposal, is 
legitimately a matter of voting. The main reason regards public disagreement 
about the effectiveness of moral bioenhancement. I find reasonable the same 
conclusion in relation to the question of public financial support to researches on 
medical bioenhancement, which is, after all, the main requirement of Persson and 
Savulescu. 
 The real problem that I see in the biomedical moral enhancement project is 
that it is unrealistic, and, in this, I agree with Sparrow (Sparrow, 2014a, 26-27). 
Things being as they are, and as they appear to be in the future that we can 
predict, the positions put forward by proponents of biomedical moral 
enhancement, in particular of those most worried about the actual situation, i.e. 
Persson and Savulescu, appear as corresponding to exactly what Miller describes 
like philosophy as lamentation (Miller, 2013, 228-249). We see a mostly worrisome 
description of our actual moral psychology as a source of threats for our future in 
virtue of the instruments at our disposal. The proposal of the way out, however, 
appears highly improbable. The suggested way out is represented by a technology 
that still does not exist. We must look for public financial resources for researches 
needed for it in the same democracies that are unable to care for their long term 
interests and suffer from limited altruism. In one of the interpretations of the issue, 
we must expect democratic support for a policy of mandatory biomedical moral 
enhancement. We must hope in a sufficiently diffused convergence among states in 
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the application of biomedical moral enhancement. We must hope in the good will 
of our governments. Finally, we must hope that terrorists will be ready to accept 
this solution. Well… It seems better to try with some other ways out.  
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